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Abstract— The generalization of open and distributed system and 
the dynamicity of the environment make the Information 
Systems (IS) and consequently its access right management 
always more complex. Even if the support of this activity appears 
to be well handed by current sophisticated solutions, the 
definition and the exploitation of an access right management 
framework appropriately adapted for a company remains 
challenging. This statement is explained mainly by the continuous 
grow of the diversity of stakeholders’ statuses and by the 
criticality of the resources to protect. To face that problem, the 
objectives of this paper are twofold. Firstly to make right 
management closer with business objectives by providing an 
innovative approach that focus on business goals for defining 
access policy. The ISO/IEC 15504 process-based model 
organization has been preferred for that research. Indeed, the 
structured framework that it offers for the description of 
activities allows to established meaningful links with 
responsibilities concepts. Secondly, to automate the deployment 
of policies through the infrastructure’s components and devices 
by defining a multi-agent system architecture that provides 
autonomy and adaptability. Free and open source components 
have been privileged for the prototyping phase. 
Identity management, Business IT-alignment, Policy 
engineering, Agent-based architecture 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Information Systems and right management are becoming 
more and more complex. This is mainly due to: firstly, the 
generalization of open system, heterogeneous, distributed and 
dynamic environment and secondly, the multiplication and the 
diversity of available solutions. In that context, defining and 
exploiting an access control policy that take care at the same 
time of the diversity of the stakeholders’ statute (worker, 
employee or manager) and of the criticality of the resources to 
protect (public, secret, confidential) is challenging. This 
challenge is moreover complicated due to the perpetual 
evolution of the organization structure, the business strategy, 
the employee’s responsibilities, and even due to the legal 
requirement in effect. 
Solutions exist to associate rights to profile and 
automatically apply those rights on all IS components and 
devices. These kinds of solutions (called IAM-Identity 
Management Solutions) are most of the time products with a 
preformatted architecture and consequently, present difficulties 
integration with the global IS solution of the company. 
At a functional layer, two major problems arise when trying 
to deal with those existing applications. Firstly, they are 
principally based on the association of stakeholders to roles 
following the RBAC model [1] or one of its derivations [4, 5]. 
In practice and in large company, those kinds of stakeholders-
roles association are often difficult to be established because of 
the need to define a strict and reduced enough number of roles. 
Indeed, it is uncommon to identify two employees with exactly 
the similar job profile. A second problem that occurs in those 
solutions is that the calculation of access right is made 
according to the value of the asset to protect, its vulnerability 
and the existing threat. IT staff is often been delegated this task 
and uses existing tools issued from the risk analysis domain to 
complete it. Those methods calculate a risk profile and propose 
solution for securing the asset without systematically validate it 
with the asset’s business owner. In that, the business owner is 
imposed a solution without having had the possibility to 
optimize the ratio “business need” / “proposed 
countermeasure”. 
Improving the way of defining the more suitable IS access 
right according to the business needs is our research’s aim. We 
are attempting to do it by the means of policy. Policy is a 
concept that has already largely been discussed in the scientific 
literature [6, 7, 8, 9]. Even if the majority of authors exploit it 
in the sense of a number of technical rules to be applied at the 
technical level [7, 8, 9], policy is also a more general concept 
used at the higher level of the company [6, 10, 11] (for 
example, Basel II [10] may be seen as imposing strategic 
policies for the financial sector). Whatever the way policy is 
perceived, we would highlight that no common definition of it 
exists yet, neither of it content [11]. However, one common 
component that is mostly present in all definitions is the right. 
In [2, 3] right is defined as: privileges that a subject can hold 
and exercise on an object. Further in [2], the author 
characterized this privilege as an access privilege to the object. 
More conceptual components of the policy exist, among others: 
responsibility, obligation [2, 3, 9, 12], delegation [9], and 
commitment. Those components are much less systematically 
integrated in the definition but it is proved that they may play 
an important role in fine grain engineering of policy. With the 
desire to keep this paper didactic and based on a common 
understanding of organization’s artifacts, the work will be 
grounded on process-based organization. 
At a technical layer, two observations are done: firstly, 
existing IAM solutions are most of the time monolithic, 
proprietary and non-flexible. Identity and Access Management 
Defined [25] explains that the complexity of integrating the 
components of IAM solutions will cause 60 percent of 
enterprises to choose product suites that are owned or licensed 
by, and supported through, one vendor. Secondly, the 
development of a Federated Identity Management (FIM) is a 
cornerstone concept that increases organization’s cooperation 
by sharing each other's resources and information. However, 
implementing such a technology is challenging because of the 
difficulty to integrate heterogeneous applications - 
consequently technologies - to heterogeneous organizations. To 
face this concern, our approach is based on the development of 
an open, agent-based solution. Advantages of this technology 
are the autonomy and the rapid and accurate adaptability 
according the context. 
With our approach, we aim to offer a new manner to 
improve the way of defining the more suitable IS access rights 
according to the business needs and deploying those rights to 
the heterogeneous IS components. 
As shown on Fig. 1, identity management is an activity that 
could be achieved following a life cycle approach. First results 
of our research attempt to bring innovation to parts “Policy 
Engineering” and “Policy Deployment”. 
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To perform this policy engineering activity, we have 
oriented our research toward a particular type of companies 
where process-based approaches are in use. Other frameworks 
should also have been chosen such as the matrix approach or 
the pyramidal one. Future extension of this work could be done 
for those alternative approaches [14]. Whatever process based 
approach for formalizing the company’s activity exists for a 
long time. A number of literature texts and norms deal with it. 
For example in [15] Ruth Sara Savén describes a Business 
Process as a combination of a set of activities within an 
enterprise with a structure describing their logical order and 
dependence whose objective is to produce a desired result or in 
CEN/ENV 12204 [16] where a business process is defined as a 
partially ordered set of enterprise activities which can be 
executed to realize a given objective of an enterprise or a part 
of an enterprise to achieve some desired end-result. Among 
existing process formalisms, the standard ISO 9000 [24] 
presents interesting perspectives in that it considers a process 
as a set of interrelated or interacting activities, which 
transforms inputs into outputs. Moreover ISO/IEC 15504 [17] 
confers a structural framework for describing process and a 
maturity model for process evaluation. Our work is based on 
the establishment of a link between concepts from ISO/IEC 
15504 and from the responsibility’s components. 
The project SIM, stands for “Secure Identity Management”, 
aims to define policy that best fit to business goals and 
requirements. This is a basic prerequisite of Business-IT 
alignment. Those goals and requirements are translated 
according to ISO/IEC 15504 throughout process’s concepts 
that are: 
• Purposes, which describes a process; 
• Outcome, which is an observable result of a process. It 
is an artefact, a significant change of state or the 
meeting of specified constraints, 
•  Base practice, which is an activity that, when 
consistently performed, contributes to achieving a 
specific process outcome; 
• Workproduct, which is an artefact associated with the 
execution of a process. It can be input (required for 
outcome achievement) or output (result from outcome 
achievement).  
Figure 1. Identity management life cycleection 2 of this paper proposes a conceptual model 
rates process concepts and responsibility components. 
on 3 presents the agent based approach for deploying 
ction 4 introduce future work and conclude. 
I. PROCESS-ORIENTED POLICY ENGINEERING 
odology 
econd section aims at defining access control policies 
organizational structure. As explained in first section, 
ative research of this policy engineering activity is to 
ed mainly on the business needs. Indeed, data access 
ortant concept for IT security. Access policies that 
ccess right must consequently be constructed at the 
e on limiting as much as possible the access to data 
holders that really need it and in the certainty that 
 right for the business’ purpose are guaranteed. 
 
Processes are observable through different outcomes and 
are achieved by using resources, base practices and 
workproducts. 
ISO/IEC 15504 has not for aim to clarify responsibilities’ 
components necessary to achieve base practices. Its maturity 
model permit to measure the maturity level of the processes 
and at the level 2 of this model appear the necessity to deal 
with responsibility. Whatever, the standard is not talkative 
about that and consequently doesn’t give much more 
information about how to deal with it. Due to that lack of 
information, we have decided to orient our work according to 
the description of the responsibility that has been published in 
[14]: the Responsibility is a set of capabilities, accountabilities 
and commitment link to a stakeholder that performs base 
practices. 
accou
 
• Capability, which describes the quality of having 
the requisite qualities or resources to achieve a 
task; 
• Accountability, which describes the state of being 
answerable about the achievement of a task. 
• Commitment, which is the engagement of a 
stakeholder to fulfil a task and the assurance he 
will do it. 
 
Note that this pledge often has a character of right and 
obligation to fulfill this action. Commitment may be declined 
under different perspectives such as the willingness of social 
actors to give their energy and loyalty to social systems or an 
affective attachment to an organization apart from the purely 
instrumental worth of the relationship [18]. For James G. 
March and Johan P. Olsen [19], rules that manage a system 
exist because they work well and provide better solutions than 
their alternative and peoples’ moral commitment is a condition 
for the existence of a common interpretation of rules. 
According to that statement and by extrapolating “rules” to 
stakeholders’ capabilities and accountabilities, commitment 
seems to be an unavoidable component. 
Defining policies from business process is obtained, in our 
research, by combining responsibilities components to 
ISO/IEC 15504 concepts. We observe quite naturally that 
firstly, the Input Workproduct is a right for a stakeholder to 
perform an activity; it is by the way combined with the 
Capability. Secondly, the Output Workproduct is a 
stakeholder’ obligation at the issue of the activity. We combine 
it with Accountability. Fig. 2 illustrates that issue. Both 
responsibilities’ components Capability and Accountability are 
strongly linked to each other [14] in that accountability of a 
role or a person permits to deduce capability of another role or 
person and conversely a capability stems from accountability 
(e.g.: The capability “An engineer has access to a specific file” 
stems from the accountability “An engineer has to share a 
specific file with another engineer”). 
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responsibilities associated to role, which are given to specific 
persons. 
• Role: which describes a role of a person in the 
organisation; 
• Person: which describes a person who interacts 
with the organisation and its processes. 
 
A policy is applicable on software such as directory 
(LDAP, Microsoft Active Directory…), file systems (NTFS, 
UFS…) and hardware like firewalls or gateways. 
Each responsibility is linked with a role, which describes a 
role of a person in the organization (role should not be 
confused with the function, for example a engineer (function) 
can be project manager and developer (roles)). 
Of course, a person can be linked to one or more roles. The 
role of a person permits to determinate policies on this person; 
for example access permission to project management folder 
on the organization’s fileserver. For being linked to a role, a 
person has to give his/her commitment. 
In practice, we are creating and extending modules in order 
to be able to define the different ISO/IEC 15504 and Identity 
management concepts into the open-source groupware 
eGroupWare [13]. 
When using the application, the business owner (or the 
person in charge to initiate the system) has to set up the 
different organization’s processes as “process templates”. A 
“process template” will describe a generic process setting up in 
the organization, for example the project management process,  
Figure 2. Relationship between 
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Figure 3. ISO/IEC 15504 and Identity management
models describes all essential project management steps. In this 
of template-process, concepts are fully generic and 
sibilities are only linked to roles. 
Fi
In order to instantiate a generic process into a specific 
process (e.g.: project management of the SIM project), each 
generic concept of this process is instantiated (process, 
outcomes, base practices, workproducts, responsibilities and 
roles) and roles are given to specific organization members. 
With all this parameters, SIM will be able to deduce a set of 
policies (hardware-applicable or not). This policy deduction 
will be developed in our future work. 
B. Case study 
To illustrate the close relation between the ISO/IEC 15504 
concepts and the identity management concepts we describe an 
example below that is a description of a part of the Process 
Assessment Model (PAM) of the project management process 
MAN3 defined in the ISO/IEC 15504. Table 1 shows the 
different concepts links to the outcome: “ 3) the tasks and 
resources necessary to complete the work are sized and 
estimated;” 
TABLE I.  MAIN CONCEPTS OF THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
ISO/IEC 15504-5:2006 Æ MAN.3 Project management 
Purpose 
The purpose of the Project management process is to 
identify, establish, co-ordinate, and monitor the 
activities, tasks and resources necessary for a project to 
produce a product and/or service, in the context of the 
project’s requirements and constraints. 
Outcomes 
… 
3) the tasks and resources necessary to complete the 
work are sized and estimated; 
… 
Base Practices 
… 
MAN.3.BP4: Determine and maintain estimates for 
project attributes. Define and maintain baselines for 
project attributes. [Outcome: 2,3] 
 
MAN.3.BP5: Define project activities and tasks. 
Identify project activities and tasks according to defined 
project life cycle, and define dependencies between 
them. [Outcome: 3] 
… 
Workproducts 
inputs 
… 
03-06 Process performance data [Outcome: 3,7] 
08-12 Project plan [Outcome: 3, 6, 7] 
10-01 Life cycle model [Outcome: 1, 3, 4, 5] 
14-06 Schedule [Outcome: 1, 3] 
… 
Workproducts 
output 
… 
08-12 Project plan [Outcome: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5] 
14-06 Schedule [Outcome: 5] 
… 
 
In the example detailed in Fig. 4, we assume that each 
person is responsible of an outcome and has accepted this 
mission (the commitment). In Fig. 4, the Outcome’s 
responsible (OR) 3, to fully realize the outcome, must have the 
capability (the right) to access to the “Process Performance 
data”, “Schedule”, “Project Plan” and the “lifecycle Model” 
resources. These elements are defined and linked to the Input 
Workproducts in the process definition. 
The “schedule capabilities” for the OR3 generate 
obligations for another resource in the organization. For 
example, the responsible of OR3 has the obligation to provide 
the capabilities to OR3 on “Input Workproducts”. In our case, 
it can be translated by a validation of an authorization request 
(induced by this “schedule capability”). 
For the “project plan”, OR3 has, at the same time, a 
capability, but has also an obligation to participate at the 
elaboration of this output workproduct. In the same idea, OR1 
and OR5 have also capabilities on the “project plan”. 
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gure 4. Responsibility decomposition of the outcome 3III.  AGENT-BASED POLICY DEPLOYMENT 
e need a means to apply policies in terms of specific 
ete rules. We think that Multi-Agent Systems technology 
olution because it provides autonomous entities able to be 
orative. 
ulti-Agent Systems definition 
 Multi-Agent System (MAS) is a system composed of 
al agents, capable of mutual interaction. The interaction 
e in the form of message passing or producing changes in 
common environment [20]. 
gents are pro-active, reactive and social autonomous 
es able to exhibit organized activity, in order to meet their 
n objectives, by eventually interacting with users. Agent 
llaborative by being able to commit itself to the society 
d another agent [21]. 
 we consider that each technical module (firewall, 
rver, LDAP directory, etc.) is interfaced with an agent, all 
s will collaborate in order to apply a set of common 
ies. 
IM's technical layer framework 
 Multi-Agent Systems gathering three types of agents 
oses the SIM’s technical architecture. Each device is 
aced with an agent called PEP for Policy Enforcement 
. The PEP communicates with an agent called PDP (for 
y Decision Point) aiming at retrieving PEP agents and 
buting policy to apply. At last, the PIE agent (Policy 
tiation Engine) interfaces the policy base in order to be 
aware of new policies to apply. Fig. 5 represents the SIM 
policy enforcement architecture with the PIE, PDP and PEP. 
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When the PDP knows which devices are able to adapt the 
policies into their specific representation, it sends messages to 
PEP. The PEP transforms policies into script or rules and 
applies them by adding a new entry in the route table or new 
access right for a file. 
To summarize, the use of a multi-agent system framework 
makes PIE, PDP and PEP able to cooperate and communicate 
between them in order to implements policies. It also provides 
flexibility, openness and heterogeneity because when we 
decide to add a new PEP, we just have to provide the agent 
able to concretely apply the policies. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper introduces the SIM approach, an innovative 
environment for defining and deploying policies in 
heterogeneous environment. SIM facilitates the right 
management by using a process approach based on business 
goals. This business-oriented approach is facilitated by the  
Figure 5. Multi-Agent System framework We give main functionalities of each kind of agents in 
wing sections. 
 Policy Instantiation Engine 
This is the interface between the policies and the agents, 
een the transformation of the business process definition 
 its deployment. PIE agent detects when new policies are 
lable and must apply or when some policies are modified 
eleted. At this moment, it sends requests to add, modify or 
te some policies to the PDP. For that, it must be able to 
e difference between new and previous organisation 
figuration by producing messages asking to add, modify or 
te policies. 
 Policy Decision Point 
The PDP agent helped by a Facilitator agent (see Fig. 5) 
rmines which PEP agents are concerned by the policies 
ate. This agent manages the network topology by retrieving 
 agents according to their localisation (devices registered 
 IP address or MAC address) or according to actions they 
ld apply and their type (firewall, fileserver, etc.). For that 
Facilitator uses white pages and yellow pages services. 
Once the PDP receives requests from the PIE, it decides 
ch PEP are concerned by the request and are able to 
lement policies in terms of rules or script on devices. Then, 
PDP sends to the concerned PEP their corresponding 
cies. 
 Policy Enforcement Point 
A PEP agent must manage each device being part of SIM’s 
nical layer. Agents are specific according to the kind of 
ices or the kind of services that the device offers. It is 
ific in order to know how transform policies represented in 
bstract format (like XACML [22] or CIM [23] for instance) 
pplicable scripts or rules. 
When a new device is added, its PEP has to register itself 
ugh the Facilitator in order to be retrieved in the yellow and 
te pages services. The registration must be done because it 
n this information that the PDP based the dispatching of 
ming policies to update. 
conjunctive use of the ISO/IEC 15504 and the identity 
management concepts. The set of policies resulting of this 
engineering can be deployed using a multi-agent system. 
Agents collaborate in order to send abstract policies to each 
device concerned and to transform and implement them 
concretely on each system by executing script for a fileserver 
or adding rules for a firewall for instance. This solution 
provides heterogeneity, flexibility and openness because of 
facilitator registering agents and same abstract policies format 
used between agents. Agents deploy common rules but 
administrator can modify system configuration directly. 
Current and future work will focus on the enhancement of 
the approach in the following domains shown on Fig. 1: the 
“Policy Audit” and the “Policy Transformation”. Concerning 
the “Policy Audit”, to avoid a difference between the 
organizational point of view and the system configuration point 
of view, we plan to give agents the ability to do an audit on 
their system to feed-back deployed policies to compare with 
the policies coming from the engineering activities. Deeper 
work in the “Policy Transformation” will also be conducted to 
develop a policy deduction strategy from the organizational 
layer to the technical one. 
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